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CLIENT-AUDITOR RELATIONSHIP:
IS MORE INDEPENDENCE NEEDED?

Is More Independence Needed?

When I agreed to speak on the subject "ClientAuditor Relationship:

Is More Independence Needed?" I

was intrigued by the opportunity the title offers to make
the shortest speech ever heard in your organization.

I

would simply say "yes" -- and sit down.

On reflection, however, I decided there are several
things I would like to say on the subject.

Our profession's Code of Ethics notes that inde
pendence is an inward quality, an expression of the integrity

of an individual.

As such, it is difficult to specify pre

cisely but is essential to the profession.

The Code goes on

to emphasize the importance of both the fact of independence
and the appearance of independence.

It proscribes particular

financial relationships with a client which might cause a

reasonable observer, who had knowledge of all the facts, to
doubt an auditor's independence.

These proscriptions are well-founded and sensible.
But I believe that most people, when they refer to the inde

pendence of an auditor, are actually thinking about a degree
of that quality which goes well beyond financial relationships.
There is ample evidence to support this conclusion.

Recent articles in the press reveal a more than slight opinion
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that the auditor should be more independent of his client
than he is now.
One of the most telling pieces of evidence of the

need for more independence appeared in the March 25th issue

of Business Week.

In its "Washington Outlook" column there

was quoted an internal staff memorandum to the Securities
and Exchange Commission noting that Commissioner James Needham

told an accountants committee that the SEC has found instances

of problems relating to "elementary disclosure, succumbing to

obvious pressure by clients., faulty judgments and decisions
at the partnership level of the certifying accounting firms,
and questions of independence bordering on commercial fraud."
These are strong words, and they came from an official in a

position to do something about the matter.

A little re

search revealed that his comments were made in November 1970.

Since then the Commission has, indeed, done a great deal about
the matter, including the filing of several complaints against
accounting firms seeking to enjoin them from violating the

anti-fraud Rule 10b-5 under the SEC Act of 1934.

Litigation Revealing Attitudes

Besides press comments of this kind, a number of
lawsuits, of which you are all aware, evidence the need for
more integrity and objectivity on the part of independent
auditors.

These cases show that judges and juries expect

auditors to be alert to suspicious circumstances and blow
the whistle on dishonest managements.
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Some lawsuits against auditors reveal an effort to
express a clean opinion on a set of financial statements,
even though company officers had engaged in highly unusual

investments and intercompany transactions and had withheld
information requested by the auditors.

A few years ago, a widely publicized lawsuit de

monstrated a belief by the SEC that when an auditor knows the
public is receiving misleading financial statements, the

auditor should make that information public.

This position,

which had not before been put forward so plainly and authori

tatively, obviously bore a relation, to the profession’s rule
of ethics on client confidentiality.

The profession reacted

with a carefully worded Statement on Auditing Procedure, which

calls for an auditor to make disclosure to a regulatory body
having surveillance over the company, if management will not.

At almost the same time the Institute’s SAP was
issued, a merger transaction took place which, the SEC re

cently alleged, was based on unaudited financial statements

that contained inaccurate or misleading items which the
auditors called to the attention of management but not the

shareholders.

Once again, a defense is asserted that client

confidentiality prohibited the auditors from revealing the

information to anyone other than corporate officers and
directors.
On the other hand, all of you can probably think

of instances where it was the auditors who blew the whistle
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on a company.

And in some of these cases the auditors were

sued nonetheless.

In cases like that the auditor performing

with distinction and independence still runs the risk of

litigation and adverse publicity.

Not being a lawyer, I can give no legal opinion on
the risks of making disclosure of something a client wants

to conceal.

But I submit for your consideration that risks

of an alleged breach of confidentiality might well be pre
ferable to the risks of an SEC injunction and a class action
by stockholders claiming damages for failure to disclose.
The public is likely to find it hard to understand why an

auditor would feel an obligation to a management that was

trying to avoid disclosure of information highly significant
to investors.

The cases I have referred to are conspicuous and

have caused considerable anguish to the accountants involved
and, to some extent, to the entire profession.

But there are,

in addition, less prominent instances of accountant attitudes
which are troublesome.

Client Management Advocacy
If, for example, a CPA attends all meetings of the

directors of a client company, refers constantly to "our
company" and "our plants," and gives the general impression
that he is part of the management, are reasonable observers
likely to believe he has the independence, objectivity and
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integrity required of an auditor?

Do you not yourselves know of cases where account
ants accompany clients to regulatory agencies and argue

positions which favor the client company but are contrary
to professional standards?

What can observers think of the

independence of accountants who do not defend professional

standards when a client finds those standards hampering?
Occasionally, this same kind of attitude reveals

itself when members of standard-setting bodies of the In
stitute advocate positions that are obviously favorable to,

say, an oil company client, insurance company client, auto
mobile company client, or conglomerate client.
Even more deeply rooted seems to be the idea of
an identity not with a particular client but with business

in general.

Accountants like to say, for example, that

’’accounting is the language of business.”

And some account

ants refer to their professional practice as a business.
Some who specialize as consultants refer to ”my end of the

business.”

Others who specialize in a particular industry

seem to be more at home in the industry and its trade asso

ciations than in professional accounting societies.

’’Built-in” anti-independence factors
In their book "The Philosophy of Auditing,” Mautz

and Sharaf note that auditing does not have my ’’built-in”
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characteristics which assure skeptics of its integrity and

independence, but that it suffers instead from what they call

"built-in anti-independence factors."

They group these anti

independence factors as, first, those arising from the nature
of the relationship between an auditor and his clients and,

second, those arising from the organization of the profession.
The factors arising from the client relationship

are the profession’s apparent financial dependence on fees
paid by companies, its rule of confidentiality, and its

rendering of a variety of services in addition to auditing.

Yet, with respect to auditor’s fees, it is obvious
that someone must pay to have audits performed, and I have

heard no feasible alternative to having the client do it.
As for confidentiality, it is an important feature

of the accounting profession, just as it is of the legal or
medical professions.

Much of the information which an auditor

receives could be detrimental to a business and its share

holders if transmitted to others.

So a management that could

not converse with its auditors in confidence would have strong

reason to withhold information necessary for the auditors to

do a proper job.

Nevertheless, confidentiality should not be

used as an excuse for an auditor to withhold from stockholders
information they ought to have.

Counselling of clients is most conspicuous in manage
ment advisory services but is just as prevalent in tax services
and is nearly always present along with auditing.

Nearly all
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auditors believe that it is not enough to do just an audit;

that their professional competence, and indeed their pro
fessional duty, requires them to give constructive advice

where opportunities arise during the course of the audit.

This can be immensely helpful and need not impair audit
objectivity.

Yet it will always be difficult to convince

the public that an advisory attitude and an independent audit

attitude can coexist within the same auditor or even within
the same accounting firm.

The anti-independence factors noted by Mautz and
Sharaf in the organization of the profession include the

emergence of a limited number of large firms, lack of pro
fessional solidarity, and a tendency toward promotional sales
manship .

Eleven years after publication of their book, com
petitive salesmanship seems, if anything, to have intensified.
Of course, the prospect of widening opportunities is important

in attracting able young people into a firm -- and new clients
are needed to sustain growth.

This fact may be conducive,

however, to laxity in maintaining professional standards when

strict observance of them seems to threaten retention of an
old client or obtaining a new one.

Manufactured safeguards of independence

Since independence is so essential to our profession,
we need to create specific safeguards to counteract the anti

independence factors cited.

Some of our colleagues tend to
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minimize the anti-independence factors by saying that auditors

conduct themselves with independence and objectivity because,
if for no other reason, the only thing they have to sell is

their reputation and they cannot afford to let it be tarnished.
Also, it is said, auditors are so keenly conscious of their

legal liabilities that they lean over backward to avoid the

risk of a lawsuit.
These points are certainly valid.

Yet the fact re

mains that the credibility of the profession has eroded.

Therefore, in my judgment, new, positive actions are needed.

Proposed Restatement of the Code of Professional Ethics
One such action would be to adopt the proposed re
statement of the Code of Professional Ethics.

The importance

of protecting and strengthening independence has been re
cognized by the restatement committee.

Its proposal goes

beyond the present rule by adding a new one on integrity and
objectivity which reads:

"A member shall not knowingly mis

represent facts, and when engaged in the practice of public

accounting, including the rendering of tax and management
advisory services, shall not subordinate his judgment to
others."

In addition to this enforceable rule of conduct, the
restated Code contains an essay elaborating on the proposition

that (and I quote) "a certified public accountant should main

tain his integrity and objectivity and, when engaged in the
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practice of public accounting, be independent of those he
serves.”
These additions to the Code significantly advance

the profession’s recognition of the basic attitude which

runs to the heart of the attest function.

It officially and

explicitly underscores that without the fact and the appearance
of independence, an auditor cannot perform adequately his

function of adding credibility to financial statements.

Who is the client?

In my opinion, a further major strengthening of
•auditor independence could be made by re-defining the word

client.

Too often auditors act as if the client were a

company's management rather than its owners.

To the credit of our committee on Code restatement,
the proposed rules of conduct do include a definition of

’’client” which reads:

"The person or entity which retains

a member or his firm, engaged in the practice of public
accounting, for the performance of professional services.”

I applaud the committee for its attempt -- yet I believe that
the definition is not free of ambiguity.

For example, under

this definition the client could be the corporation as a
whole or the person within management who retained the public

accounting firm.

Use of the word "client” throughout the restated
Code, it seems to me, shows vestiges of the use commonly pre
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vailing today — namely, that the client is the president

or financial vice president or other corporate officer who
has negotiated the engagement.

A definition of client geared to 1972 might say
that a client is a person or entity which engages a public

accountant or accounting firm to perform services -- and

then go on to state that, in the case of a corporation, the
investors constitute the entity.

Under this kind of de

finition an auditor could not cite the client confidentiality
rule as justification for reporting to the officers and board

of directors but not the stockholders — for it would be the
latter who really constituted the client.

As already provided

in SAP 41, where it was impractical for an auditor to give
notification to the stockholders at large, notification to
a regulatory agency such as the SEC could be stipulated as

sufficient disclosure.

Change in auditor

An encouraging recent development affecting independ
ence is the new SEC requirement for reporting a change in

auditor.

The Institute worked closely with the SEC in de

veloping this requirement in the Commission’s Form 8-K.

In a dialog continuing over several months, the
SEC and the Institute became increasingly concerned about

"shopping for accounting principles."

This concern stemmed

not only from the relatively few instances where a change in
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auditor appeared to involve a dispute with a client over

accounting principles but from the pressure that might be

exerted on an auditor through the mere threat of change.
The amendment to Form 8-K on this matter, among

others, was adopted in September of last year.

Now, if a

new auditor has been engaged, the 8-K Form filed with the

Commission must report the date of engagement, and the re

gistrant must furnish the Commission a separate letter

stating whether in the preceding 18 months there were any
disagreements with the former auditor about accounting prin
ciples which, if not resolved to the satisfaction of the

former auditor, would have caused him to refer in his opinion
to the subject matter of the disagreement.

Furthermore, the

registrant has to furnish the Commission a letter from the
former auditor stating whether he agrees with the statements
in the registrant's letter.
When the proposed new rule was circulated for com

ment, the Institute suggested that the letters concerning the
reasons for the change of auditor be non-public, but in the

final release the SEC wisely decided against this restriction.
Already the Wall Street Journal has published a revealing

article based on an 8-K report, and I hope there will be more.
The bright light of publicity should go far in strengthening
the hand of an auditor in dealing with a client who wants
to cut corners, and also in deterring a firm from lowering

standards to obtain a client.
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Standing audit committees of outside directors
Another way of buttressing auditor independence is

for corporations to create audit committees composed of out

side directors.

Such committees nominate the independent

auditors of their companies’ financial statements and keep in
contact with the auditors concerning their work.
Five years ago the American Institute of CPAs urged

appointment of audit committees, and last month the Securities
and Exchange Commission endorsed establishment of such com

mittees in all publicly-held companies.

In doing so, the

SEC noted that it had recommended such committees in 1940
following the McKesson &' Robbins investigation.

The movement

for audit committees also received strong support in a 1970

research study by Robert K. Mautz and Fred L, Neumann.

With this kind of backing, audit committees should
soon become standard features of corporate organization.

They

provide opportunity for auditors to discuss problems where
there is a disagreement between the auditors and company

management, and they can contribute significantly toward

easing management pressures against auditors.

Public sector or private sector
The primary role of the independent auditor is to
add credibility to financial representations made by others.

The audit function is thus essential to the public interest.
In the performance of this function it is imperative that the
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public have confidence in the independence and objectivity
of those doing the work.

If the public loses faith in those

now performing it, there will be a drastic change in the way

the audit function is carried out.
I have cited four specific steps which should help

strengthen auditor independence —
• The restated Code of Professional Ethics
• A redefinition of client to mean the owners

and investors in a business

• Standing audit committees of outside directors
• Reporting reasons for a change in auditor.
This last step is already an SEC rule.

If improve

ments in auditor independence are not soon perceptible to
concerned regulatory agencies, sophisticated segments of the

public, and legislators, more rules and regulations are in
evitable.

And if more regulation fails, the entire concept

of an independent audit
be brought into question.

function in the private sector will

If auditors are not regarded as

independent, what use is their function?

If in this circum

stance the function is considered essential, what alternative

is there to having it carried out by a government agency or
by the profession under strict government regulation?
Forty years ago when Congress was considering

securities legislation, some Congressmen suggested that the
auditing function belonged in a Federal agency,

Leading

accountants persuaded the Congress that the function could be
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ing profession.
I believe that the record proves this to be so —

that the performance of the auditing function by the pro

fession has been outstanding.

But in these past forty years

not only has the level of audit performance risen, so have
public expectations, and even faster.

If the profession

cannot remain at least one step ahead of these expectations,
government auditing of private business looms as a possibility.

Some CPAs shrug off this possibility, citing a pre
sumed inability of the government to create a staff large

enough to handle the job.
It would obviously take some time for a Federal

agency to be created which could audit all publicly-held cor
porations.

But consider that probably fewer than 50,000

accountants in the private sector are now engaged in auditing
these corporations — while probably a number nearly that
large are already engaged in auditing for

the Federal govern

ment in capacities ranging from internal revenue agent to

defense contract auditor to General Accounting Office auditor.
In light of this I think that a large enough staff could be

established within government.
On the other hand, if a Federal auditing agency is
not considered feasible, there is the danger that the account

ing profession could be brought under government control through

legislation providing for a Federal CPA certificate and Federally
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determined standards.

To some, Federal regulation may appear to be a

golden opportunity to bring uniformity to the diverse state
requirements.

But it is inevitable that making the accounting

profession subject to Federal regulation would result in loss
of professional autonomy.
Instead of CPAs determining their professional re

quirements and standards, a Federal agency would do so.

It

is easy to see this Federal agency setting education and

experience requirements, determining the content of the CPA
examination, laying down rules of professional conduct, and
imposing accounting and auditing standards.
In order to obviate developments of this sort

(which I’m certain would be unwanted by most businessmen and
government officials alike) the public accounting profession
must re-dedicate itself to independence and objectivity.

An editorial on client-auditor relationship in the
April 22, 1972 issue of Business Week concludes, "But the
final decision about the future of accounting must be made

by the accountants themselves.

To preserve their credibility,

they must first of all preserve their independence."

Basically, it comes down to a matter of attitude.
Accountants must decide whether they are engaged in a com
mercial activity with a few professional overtones, or in a

profession which, like all professions, inevitably entails
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some elements of business but without allowing these elements
to become dominant.

As for myself,
I see but one rational and good

decision:

accountancy is clearly a profession.

Independent

and objective conduct by the overwhelming preponderance of
practitioners is required to demonstrate that this decision
has been taken.

